Hoist with its own petard - The Isalnd editorial
November 21, 2005For its defeat at the Presidential Election, the UNP has no one to blame but itself. It unwittingly engineered its own defeat by making a highly unnecessary move, which triggered a political avalanche. It all began with the UNP’s call for a presidential election at a time the electorate had taken it for granted that the next presidential election was due only in 2006.
President Kumaratunga’s popularity was on the wane and her actions were doing more harm than good to the UPFA government. The JVP had broken ranks with it over the controversial P-TOMS. President Kumaratunga stood accused of furthering her personal interests at the expense of her government through a deal with the LTTE. The government was becoming unpopular by the day (as evident from the erosion of its vote base in most of electorates and the increase in the UNP vote despite Ranil’s defeat at Thursday’s election).
The UNP should have allowed her to continue until next year. Either it was cocky that it could successfully face an early presidential poll or it may have thought that by stepping up pressure on the government to call a presidential election, instead it would be able to get a general election from a badgered CBK desperate to take a warring Opposition off her presidential back. This, some believe, was the card up Ranil’s sleeve, when he chose to foot it out from Devinuwara to Colombo through the tsunami hit southern littoral.
In politics, as in life, nothing is so certain as the unexpected. The JHU, which is adept at stealing others’ thunder–remember how it stole the show at the Donor Conference in Kandy and eclipsed the JVP in the protest against P-TOMS–made a master move. It took the battle for the presidential election to courts. And the rest is history.
Another mistake the UNP committed was to make Prime Minister Rajapakse the underdog in the race, by siding with President Kumaratunga who was slapping road blocks one after the other on his way. For the well organized and obviously well funded UNP propaganda blitz the state media still under President Kumaratunga’s control was no match. Propaganda, if it is to be effective, should be positive and subtle, but the UNP campaign was far from that. The outcome was that Mahinda projected himself as the victim of a conspiracy and a great deal of sympathy accrued to him as a result.
The most negative aspect of the UNP campaign was the attempt to drag religion into it. In these columns we have likened some propagandists to that legendary monkey which in good faith tried to kill a mosquito on a sleeping king and cut him to death in the process. Such tactics as were employed by the UNP propagandists were na`EFve and counterproductive. In a society where politics has attained the status of a major religion, simply because the clergy ask the people to vote for a particular party, they are not going to do so. If so, the JHU would have captured state power last year as all the candidates in the fray were Buddhist monks.
Moreover, the UNP, possibly due to the wrong advice, pinned its hopes on the northern vote–it was said to be looking at something like 450,000 votes–which it sought to gain by appeasing the LTTE. It didn’t realise that the LTTE’s claim of having over half a million votes at its disposal was highly bloated. True, the LTTE delivered 650,000 votes to its proxy, the TNA last year in the North and the East. But it did so through large scale rigging.
The heavy presence of polls observers from the EU, which is considering a total ban on the outfit made the LTTE wary of mass rigging. Had it supported Ranil openly and allowed the Tamil people to freely exercise their franchise, it would have exposed its real strength as well as the actual number of people living in areas under its control. That kind of exposure is detrimental to its interests. So, a polls boycott was the only option. It was not a matter of the LTTE not loving anyone or loving anyone less; it was a matter of the LTTE loving its cause more.
The UNP by wooing the Tigers, on the other hand, antagonized the Southern electorate, where the JVP through its Ali-Koti theory generated a massive protest vote to compensate for the loss of votes due to CBK pulling in a different direction.
In the end, Ranil failed to secure either the northern or the southern vote and fell between two stools. He should have heeded the saying: A bird in hand is worth two in the bush.
The CWC and the SLMC may have delivered some votes but the UNP’s obsequiousness to them and the deals struck between them in a hurry alienated a vast number of voters in the south. And some of those failed kingmakers are now said to be trying to crown themselves by leaving Ranil and throwing in their lot with Mahinda.
Ranil is more a victim of a badly planned strategy than an individual loser. The UNP, thanks to its miscalculations and blunders, snatched defeat from the jaws of what might have been its victory. And the defeat has been debited to Ranil’s account. However unfortunate it may be, there is little he can do about it.
