Lanka Citizen

These analysts don’t seem to see the contradictions in the LTTE behaviour. The LTTE says one thing officially and indicates the opposite in the way they criticize the two candidates. They have by all means suggested to the ordinary Tamils that the LTTE prefers Ranil to win, and that is to whom the ordinary Tamils who are in fear of the LTTE is going to vote, if they go to vote. All pro LTTE websites including the Tamil Net very clearly show this “unofficial” stand of the LTTE. The two Catholic Bishops in the East have announced that the demands not to vote are not from the LTTE and that the Tamil people should get out and vote. Does this apply only to the East? What about the North and the Vanni?

Here is one fear story from the Sunday Island Defence Correspondent.

Is Sri Lanka once again on the brink of war, no matter who wins the Presidency on November 17?

……the aggressive stance and clear preparations for war on the part of the LTTE have got some parts of the intelligence-gathering community wondering whether this is a possibility, according to Army sources.

The manner in which the LTTE has deliberately not taken a clear stance on supporting either of the presidential candidates, is a grave cause for concern. In the past, the LTTE has exhorted voters in the Northeast to cast their ballots for the UNP, if the Tigers’ ally the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) was not running in the polls. But this time, contrary to all expectations, the Tigers have not been supporting the Wickremasinghe campaign. The fact that they are allowing Tamil voters in the Northeast the choice of deciding on whom to vote for, seems ominous simply due to the fact that the LTTE has never allowed freedom of expression, or even freedom of thought. It appears as though the outcome of the election does not matter to the LTTE and its plans do not hinge on who the victor will be.

Conventional wisdom among analysts in Colombo says that a victory by the UNP candidate would help to preserve the status quo. Yet, there is no hard evidence on the ground in the Northeast to support this. Indeed, this assumption that the Tigers are ready to continue the ceasefire under a UNP regime may be a fatal mistake.

In contrast to the LTTE, the armed forces have never been weaker, in terms of readiness of soldiers to take on the LTTE. Much of the senior leadership of all three armed services is also suspect in terms of decisiveness and the ability to take responsibility for battles without the backing of political leaders.

The fact is that the LTTE has now spent nearly four years at peace. Although the Ceasefire Agreement was signed only in March 2002, the LTTE began its unilateral ceasefire on Christmas Day of 2001, shortly after Ranil Wickremasinghe became Prime Minister. The armed forces, although officially at war for another three months, also did not undertake any major offensive operations, and thus the ceasefire became a reality on the ground even though it was not to become official until March 2002.

This period of 46 months is by far the longest time that the LTTE has observed a truce. The earlier longest truce was in 1989/90 which lasted only 13 months. The ceasefire of 1994/95 lasted less than six months. Simply put, it is not in the nature of the LTTE to observe a truce, unless it is forced to do so, usually by global events.

One of the most significant factors in persuading the LTTE to observe the ceasefire was the aggressive stance of US President George W. Bush over the last several years since the September 11 attacks in the US. Bush showed a particular liking for invading other countries, actually doing so in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, and making open threats towards North Korea, Iraq and Syria. However, Bush’s overseas adventures have become bogged down with more than 2,000 American soldiers having died in Iraq where an open revolt has been growing ever stronger. In Afghanistan too, US troops continue to fight the Taleban, which shows no indication of letting up.

With US public support for foreign ventures waning, and with Bush’s domestic popularity being at an all-time low due to political scandals in the White House and the pitiful response of the US Federal Government in the Hurricane Katrina disaster, it is unlikely that Bush would play a significant role in a war in yet another country, especially one such as Sri Lanka, where ground conditions are far tougher due to the abundant jungles, than the open deserts of Iraq and the bare mountains of Afghanistan. In other words, the Tigers may believe that the time is ripe, locally and globally, for them to go back to war and seize the land they call Eelam, once and for all. Indeed, LTTE senior cadres have been warning their fighters that they should prepare for war again, promising that this time it would be the final solution to the Northeast war.

This week, naval patrols once again detected an LTTE boat movement on the high seas, indicating that the Tigers are rapidly moving in arms and ammunition to the Northeast from foreign countries. Five LTTE boats were seized 60 miles off Sangammankanda which is south of the Trincomalee area. Interestingly, only one boat was manned by one cadre, and four boats also had no engines. This indicates that the shipment that the boats were awaiting included outboard motors, which would have been attached within minutes to the boats. The cadre is now in custody.

This column exclusively reported previously that the Tigers were using the area between Muttur and Batticaloa to land cargo, with naval and air patrols concentrating on the more northern area between Trincomalee and Jaffna, especially the Mullaittivu coast. We repeatedly warned that the navy’s preoccupation with the Mullaittivu area was allowing the Tigers free access to the east coast. Intelligence has confirmed that the Tigers have received 11 shipments of arms during the last two years, a frightening rate of a shipload every two months at least. Since each shipload can carry enough ammunition for the LTTE to carry on fighting for at least three months, it is clear that the Tigers are now more than ready for a long, protracted campaign. Two weeks ago we broke the news of yet another shipment having arrived, which was later confirmed by the navy.

The LTTE has never been stronger militarily, in number of cadres, training, and number of Black Tiger suicide bombers and Pistol Group cadres in attack positions in Colombo and towns in the Northeast such as Trincomalee, Jaffna and Batticaloa. The Air Wing is also now ready for war, with at least four aircraft operational. As exclusively reported by this column, one of these aircraft is a twin-engined one, although the Air Force Commander publicly scoffed at the notion. But then, the Air Force had previously refused to accept the reality that the Air Wing was in the air, until one of its own surveillance drones brought back a TV movie of one of the Tiger planes. Even then, the Air Force preferred to believe that it was just one aircraft until a second different one was sighted. Once again, the threat from them was belittled by the Air Force, but now intelligence has warned that the Air Tigers possess not two but four aircraft. The Air Force has done little to prepare for the possibility of these aircraft being used in war, preferring to blindly believe that they are not a significant threat.

The President herself appears quite disinterested in matters of such national importance. But with only a few more days to go in her presidency, that is not only natural, but quite logical. After the many controversies that swirled around her throughout this year, she is finally bowing out gracefully from the presidency, if not from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. This allows the next president a free hand in running the country, ensuring a smooth transition as far as she is concerned.

Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse is clearly not at all interested in the looming danger. Preoccupied with his political campaign, and squabbling with the President and his running mate Anura Bandaranaike, the PM has held no meetings with any senior officers of the armed forces, except when he happened to be campaigning in an area close to or in the Northeast. Even then, he did not discuss any strategic matters with them.

One of the major problems is the deep distrust of the PM towards the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. All these top officers were appointed by the President during her tenure as Minister of Defence. But what made matters worse is the fact that each has been perceived as being quite close to her, and have quite easily received extensions of service.

Again, the Mahinda camp was extremely angry at the manner in which the top brass failed to liaise properly with the PM during the first three days of the Tsunami disaster rescue operations, when the President was still in London and the Premier was in charge.

UNP candidate Ranil Wickremasinghe has also not paid much heed to the possibility of the Tigers returning to hostilities, even if he is elected. There is a blind faith in the UNP camp that the LTTE is ready to accept the status quo and continue with the present ceasefire agreement, should Wickremasinghe become president.

There is no indication that the LTTE is preparing to strike before the election, which could be an indication that there is still a distinct possibility that the Tigers may yet stay away from war until the political situation in Colombo is settled, in order to see what the new government’s policies are towards the Tigers.

http://www.island.lk/2005/11/06/defence.html