Lanka Citizen

by V.S. Sambandan

Midway into the Sri Lankan election campaign, the focus of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is on wooing the uncommitted Sinhalese voter.

As a poll-weary country weighs its choices, the personalities of the two main Presidential candidates, the perceptions surrounding them, and the precedents set by them are factors that can tilt the scales on November 17.

The waning of federalism from the conflict-resolution discourse, the electoral outbidding by the two main candidates through promises of economic populism and the potential of parties to stir passions do not augur well for a healthy debate on how the country should be run for the next six years.

Winning over the uncommitted Sinhalese voter is critical given the island’s ethnic mix. In the divided polity, the majority Sinhalese (76.59 per cent) are split nearly equally in their loyalties between Rajapakse’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP). A large majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils (10.96 per cent), Muslims (9.18 per cent), and Tamils of Indian origin (1.16 per cent) are disenchanted with Rajapakse’s alliance partners.

The candidates, hence, would have to go the extra mile to win the uncommitted Sinhalese voter to reach the required 50 per cent of the valid votes to win the election. With no visible swing yet in favour of either candidate, the campaign currently lacks the lustre that should surround the most vital democratic exercise for any nation - directly electing a constitutionally powerful Executive President.
The dominating theme of the Wickremesinghe campaign has not yet struck a chord among the Sinhalese majority electorate, based on the assumption that “peace has arrived.” The character of the alliances struck by Rajapakse and Wickremesinghe also engages the minds of the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils and Muslims.

While the uncommitted minority vote has moved away from Rajapakse, he has not yet fully consolidated the non-partisan Sinhalese vote. It is here that the electoral swing becomes critical. With a nearly equally divided committed bloc of Sinhalese voters for the SLFP and the UNP, the key for past Presidential victors was their ability to win over minorities and sway the floating Sinhalese votes with a winnable election plank.

For instance, the late Ranasinghe Premadasa’s twin promises of “expelling the Indian interventionists” and “talking peace to the Tigers,” and Chandrika Kumaratunga’s peace package of “devolution and constitutional reforms.”

In the absence of a swing, the November 2005 Presidential election is all about the three P - Personality, Perception, and Precedent. On all three counts Rajapakse and Wickremesinghe are as different as chalk and cheese.

The Prime Minister carefully maintains the image of a people’s person. He dresses traditionally, with a flowing red sash around his neck, reflecting his left-of-centre political ideology, and portrays himself as apey Mahinda (Our Mahinda) of the majority Sinhalese.

Wickremesinghe is dressed in slacks, quite often wears a designer jacket, and also talks directly to small groups of the electorate along the campaign trail. He is seen as one who is “friendlier with the Tigers and wants to do business with them” a negative when it comes to the uncommitted Sinhalese voter.

Rajapakse comes across as one who plays the nationalist tune to consolidate the Sinhalese vote - a negative among the uncommitted minorities. In terms of the precedents set by the two, Wickremesinghe is credited with “stopping the war” - a definite positive across the island and signing the ceasefire agreement, a move that evokes strongly mixed emotions, particularly whenever the LTTE strikes in Colombo.

Rajapakse has little to show on conflict-resolution and economic policy. An even more significant precedent is that no President has won without the support of the ethnic minorities - at least significant sections of them.

Even in 1999, when President Kumaratunga lost most of the Sri Lankan Tamil vote, she had the support of the two other key minority parties - the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, both of whom are now aligned with Wickremesinghe.

As the poll pendulum of an emotional electorate sways, the major determinant would be the manner in which the two extremes of Sri Lanka’s polity - the LTTE and the JVP assert their positions. Much of the undecided Sinhalese vote would be swung by incidents or pronouncements that trigger an emotional passion that is absent for now.

(The Hindu)

President of the Lanka Private Bus Owners Association (LPBOA) Gemunu Wijeratne yesterday expressed his opposition to the donation of 177 buses by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for Public Sector Bus Transportation. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government said the buses were donated to recover the set back of the passenger transportation system in the country. Wijeratne, protesting the move by the Tokyo authorities, said that if they are donating buses to revamp the ailing public sector transport system they should provide buses to the private bus operators since the private busmen are responsible for 80 % of conutry’s passenger transport fleets with 18,500 buses in operation, including in the north and the east with 500 buses in Jaffna district alone.

According to Transport Ministry Secretary, D. S. Jayaweera `EC the buses so far received from the 177 fleet donated by Japan has been used to strengthen the urban bus services and reduce the traffic congestion by attracting low occupancy vehicle users. At present the poor level of urban bus services has encouraged the increase of low occupancy vehicles he said adding it was a timely move by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. “These buses will be made use to improve the Urban Transportation System.

Already 69 buses have been received by the Ministry while the rest is being shipped” Jayaweera said.

Wijeratne accused the government of incurring additional expenditure of Rs 100 million a month to pay salaries to the employees after the SLCTB was revamped recently. Asked whether revamping the SLCTB wouldn’t have competition in the passenger bus transportation system hitherto monopolized by the private bus owners he said the SLCTB will run in to losses in the future due to unnecessary expenditure and excess staff.

Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda in a message said ‘Sri Lanka’s demand for a good and a quality transport system has been growing with urbanization and industrialization. Colombo which is smaller than Tokyo, is still densely populated and hence would require more convenient transport service to meet the needs of the people. It is equally important that adequate buses are provided to other cities and rural areas of Sri Lanka as well.

THE ISLAND |

Tisaranee Gunasekara

“Good Gods! What do I see?” Moliere (Amphitryon)

After the parliamentary election of 2004 Ranil Wickremesinghe appointed the Panditharatne Commission to look into the reasons for the UNP’s ignominious defeat. The Report of the Commission, though never made public, makes interesting reading. One old timer complaints that he wrote to Sirikotha more than 60 times and never received so much as a post card in reply; the defence of the Sirikotha hierarchy was that there was no money to buy stamps! Another witness, when told of this defence, pointed out that the party could perhaps sell some of the machines in the state-of-the art gym (another innovation of the Wickremesinghe leadership) in the basement and buy stamps.

One of the main findings of the Panditharatne Commission was that under the Wickremesinghe leadership the UNP has become alienated from its national-popular roots and from its rural mass base (the gym is perhaps symbolic of this makeover). Many of those who gave evidence felt that in the eyes of the public the party has become too identified with the interests of the urban upper classes; they also opined that the resultant inability to understand and deal with the problems faced by the ordinary masses (especially in the rural heartland) made a significant contribution to the debacle of April 2004. The conduct of Mr. Wickremesinghe in the ongoing election campaign indicates that he is making an effort to remedy this weakness, in his own fashion. He cannot do anything about his politico-electoral dependence on the Tigers; having stepped into the shoes of so many dead men most of them killed by the Tigers he would know that keeping the Feline happy is necessary not only for votes but also and more importantly to stay alive. Therefore he is trying to make himself more acceptable to the Sinhala majority by focusing on religion, on replacing nationality with religion as the main building block of ‘nation’. The Wickremesinghe strategy seems to be one of promoting religious overdetermination - to cover his appeasing of the LTTE with the Buddhist flag and to replace national interests with religious interests. In doing so he is making himself part of a globalied phenomenon of religious nationalism according to which religion is as much of a determinant factor as race/country of origin in deciding one’s ‘true’ nationality. The JHU was the pioneering representative of this trend in Sri Lanka, and now Mr. Wickremesinghe seems to be adopting the same line.

Obviously with this idea in mind a few months ago he published a series of articles in the ‘Sinhala nationalist’ Divaina on Buddhism and politics; these articles were subsequently published as a book and publicly launched with much fanfare. The objective was to don the garb of a knowledgeable and a pious leader committed to the fostering of Buddhism the Buddhist Philosopher-King; this would enable Mr. Wickremesinghe to seem less alien and become more acceptable to the Sinhala-Buddhist core voter; winning back those UNPers who opted for the JHU at the 2004 election would be another aim of this exercise.

Going Religious
According to media reports Mr. Wickremesinghe is making a valiant effort to make ‘religion’ the main issue in this election campaign and to put himself forward as the Defender of Faith. He has promised to build the tallest dagaba in the world in Sri Lanka, to develop Buddhagaya and to make this country the centre of Theravada Buddhism in the world. He also has regular ‘daham hamuwas’, well choreographed meetings with handpicked groups of Buddhist monks, at which he answers question on politics and other related matters as well as his own future plans. True this determination to seem more Buddhist than everyone else has made Mr. Wickremesinghe commit many a faux pas. His detractors have been at pains to point out that he gets so many basic facts about Buddhism and Buddhist history wrong; they point out that the world’s tallest dagaba is already in Sri Lanka and that the first dhammasangayanawa was not held in Buddhagaya, as he claimed, but in Rajagahanuwara. Mr. Wickremesinghe however is continuing with his efforts unfazed by the derisive laughter of his opponents, probably because this is an election he cannot afford to loose. It is being openly whispered that Mr. Wickremesinghe may finally have to give up the party leadership if he loses this election. Mr. Wickremesinghe’e attempts to recast nationalism as religious nationalism is understandable in this context. It is an open secret that the UNF is expecting to get the Tamil vote of the North (and whatever the Tigers can deliver in the East as well) en block. Mr. Wickremesinghe needs those votes if he is to beat his rival. This means keeping the soft line on the Tigers, being careful not to criticise them in any way. But as the Panditharatne report indicates such kowtowing is not popular in the South, even among some UNPers; this partisanship for the Tigers is one reason why Mr. Wickremesinghe lost a sizeable chunk of the UNP vote to the JHU at the last general election. The focusing on Buddhism is one way in which he hopes win back this lost vote. Though not many of them would go to Mahinda Rajapakse (despite the open espousal of the PM’s candidacy by the JHU) there is a possibility that a majority will be picked up by a third candidate, most probably Victor Hettigoda, who with his pro-UNP record may be acceptable to quite a few disgruntled UNPers.

So Ranil Wickremesinghe is in the reform mode. He is trying to make himself over in every possible area, to make himself more acceptable to the majority of the people out there in the rural heartland. He tries to look a regular guy, to look relaxed and act friendly; he claps on stage to the tune of an old Sinhala song Hela jathika abhimane which has become the theme song of his campaign (unlike in 2004 when a special song about Mr. Wickremesinghe was the theme song); he visits temples and talks about history and promises to usher in a Parakum Yugaya. Basically he tries to give the impression of a new, more organic leader, someone who is in touch with the national mood, ethos and history.

But there is one exception to this rule and that concerns the Tigers. Even to win the election Mr. Wickremesinghe seems unwilling to be critical of the Tigers, even obliquely. True he has not done what he did in the 1991 presidential election identify with the Tigers openly; instead he talks about taking the ceasefire forward, meaning of course he will let the Tigers observe the ceasefire in the way they want. As the events of the last 3 years demonstrate amply that the logical destination of this peace process is not a united Sri Lanka with the people of the North and the East entitled to all the political and human rights enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry but a North-East which is totally under Tiger control with its people denied every single human right that the rest of the populace take for granted. Given the unwillingness to change and the incapacity for reform on the part of the LTTE, given the Tigers’ total rejection of political pluralism, multi-party democracy and basic human rights this peace process can never result in a peaceful, democratic and a federal Sri Lanka.

The latest incident which highlights the Tigers’ contempt for democratic values is their imposition of a ‘dress code’ in Jaffna: “Posters put up by the LTTE have detailed separate dress codes for females and males. The growth of beard and long hair has been forbidden for young men. For girls close fitting shirts and skirts have been banned along with the wearing of trousers. Instead girls have been asked to wear the Tamil costume of Salwar Kameez. ‘This seems to be worse than the Taleban, but how do we protest’ a young Tamil university student wondered… ‘Normally a directive like this will bring us out to the road in fiery protest. But this is Jaffna and for us this is like living in a killing field’ a women’s rights activist said” (Dawn 18.10.2005; emphasis mine). Given all this evidence one will indeed have to be amazingly naïve to believe that Tigers can ‘reform, that they will agree to respect basic human rights and consequently that this peace process can ever result in a democratic solution.

The Other Problem
For Mahinda Rajapakse the need is not to win over the Sinhala Buddhist voters but to obtain a segment of the minority votes. He has two ways of achieving this objective. One is through a series of alliances with the Tamil and Muslim parties. Since the Tigers will never back him it makes sense for him to obtain the backing of the anti-Tiger parties. He already has the EPDP and one faction of the EPRLF with him; however he needs more, especially the backing of Col. Karuna in the East.

He also needs to, unlike his rival, project a pluralist, rather than a Sinhala Buddhist image. He has to convince the minorities that his agenda is not a Sinahal/Buddhist supremacist one and if elected President he will not try to usher in another 1956. The UNP has never been a Sinhala Buddhist party but that was the SLFP’s core identification until Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga changed it. Therefore it is not enough for Mahinda Rajapakse to be non-Sinhala chauvinist; he must show that he is anti-Sinhala chauvinist. The fact that he (like the UNP leaders) has refused to identify himself with the Anti-conversion Bill of the JHU is a positive sign. After all it was electoral compulsions which made SWRD Bandaranaike adopt Sinhala Only. Today thanks to the Jayawardene Constitution the electoral compulsions work in the opposite direction. The two main parties need minority support both to win the Presidency and to form a stable government. If Mr. Rajapkse understands this basic fact it will serve both him and the country well.

Tamils are not Tigers, any more than the Muslims are the SLMC or the Sinhalese are the JVP (or even SLFP or UNP alone) and Buddhists are the JHU. Mr. Rajapakse would do well to understand this distinctionand to adopt a hard line towards the Tigers (being soft on them will bring him no advantages) together with a soft line on devolution. According to some media reports he had expressed interest in the quasi-federal constitution of India and this is definitely a positive sign. In the ‘three step’ proposal put forward by the EPDP there lies a glimmer of a solution that will eventually result in a marginalisation of the Tigers and a federal set up. Mr. Rajapakse thus has more options than his main rival, but whether he will chose to avail himself of these options or remain a prisoner of the Sinhala Buddhist mindset remains to be seen.

courtesy Lanka Academic